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Abstract
We investigate possible origins of the trend in financial markets, where trend
we refer to as is a relatively long-term fluctuation observed in price change
(price movement), using a simple deterministic threshold model that con-
tains no external driving force term to generate trends forcibly. We find
that the trend can be generated by this simple model without any external
driving force. Furthermore, from thorough numerical simulations, we obtain
two following results: (i) a trend of monotonic increase or decrease can be
generated only by dealers’ minuscule price updates for the next deal trying to
follow an expected forthcoming direction of price change, (ii) non-monotonic
trends spontaneously emerge when dealers cannot obtain accurate informa-
tion about the number of dealers participating in the next deal. We conclude
from these results that the emergence of trends is not necessarily generated
by an external driving force but an natural outcome of the accumulation of
minuscule price updates of individual dealers with insufficient information
about the next deal.
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Many phenomena in human society are dominated by human choices.
Buying and selling is one of them, and we regard financial markets as an
aggregation of dealers’ choices and their interactions. A major indicator in
a financial market is its price change (price movement). Generally speaking,
price change in financial markets fluctuates irregularly, as shown in Fig. 1.
However, the mechanism of the fluctuations has not been elucidated yet, and
the question still remains to be challenging. There are two major approaches
to tackle the question. One is to investigate features or natures of the data
generated by a dynamical system from the viewpoint of statistics [1, 2, 3],
and the other is to construct an artificial market using a model and investi-
gate events in the market [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. The merit of the former
approach is that it provides us with various knowledge and insights for the
understandings of the nature of price changes. However, this approach is
restrictive, because it does not always lead us to a deeper understanding of
the mechanism of price changes produced by the interaction between dealers’
choices and various market price properties [10]. In contrast, the latter ap-
proach significantly contributes to clarifying the mechanism. As the purpose
of this paper is to find possible origins1 of relatively long-term fluctuations
generally observed in financial market price changes, which we refer to as
“trends,” we follow the latter approach (we will describe the details of our
definition of trends later).
Some models, which are categorized as the dealer model, have been pro-
posed [4, 5, 11]. The dealer model is an agent-based model and constructs an
artificial market. The first dealer model was introduced by Takayasu et al.
in 1992 [4]. They considered that a market is composed of many dealers and
buying and selling are interactions among them with discontinuous (nonlin-
ear) and irreversible processes. To implement this mechanism they intro-
duced a numerical model of financial market prices using threshold dynam-
ics [4]. In the model a deterministic dynamics is assumed for an assembly of
agents describing mutual trades by threshold dynamics including discontin-
uous irreversible interactions. After this pioneering work, numerous studies
have been done (for example, see Refs. [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]), aiming for im-
provement and refinement to be able to reproduce basic empirical laws such
as the power-law distribution of price changes, slow decay of auto-correlation
1We use the term, “origin,” as the cause and source of existence.
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Figure 1: Examples of price changes in financial markets showing short-term variabilities
and trends: (a) Tick data of Japanese Yen/US dollar (JPY/USD) exchange rate and
(b) tick data of gold price at New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) futures. Both the
data are taken for 48 hours from twelve midnight on 3 February 2014 to twelve midnight
on 4 February 2014. The data can be obtained from http://ratedata.gaincapital.com/
of volatility, and so on. For the details see [11].
In this paper, we observe afresh the behaviours of financial market data
carefully. As mentioned above, price changes in financial markets show irreg-
ular fluctuations (see Fig. 1). These irregular fluctuations are usually divided
into two main features, short-term variabilities and “trends.” However, we
would like to emphasize that this separation seems to be done rather arbitrary
by simple visual inspection. A trend we recognize is a general or rough direc-
tion of continuous movement such as upward, downward or sideways during
an arbitrary “long” period of observation compared to the unit time length
for taking time series data of price change. If we take a longer observational
time, a trend in a certain period might be considered as a mere fluctuation
around another large trend in the longer period of time (See Fig. 2). Whether
a movement in price change is recognized as a short-term fluctuation or a
trend is, therefore, a matter of observational time scale and the separation
is rather arbitrary. This is our definition for trends and we recognize trends
by this definition.
It should also be noted that there seems to be a vague consensus that
trends are driven by some external factors such as economical fundamentals
and that short-term variabilities are fluctuations around these trends due to
stochastic nature of individual deals. Hence, existing models seems to have
been built or improved based on this consensus dealing with these two fluctu-
ations (short-term variabilities and trends) separately. A possible origin for
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Figure 2: (Colour online) Examples of “trends” we recognize: (a) daily JPY/USD exchange
rate from 2 January 2007 to 31 December 2013 and (b) tick data of JPY/USD exchange
rate for 24 hours in 7 August 2013 (Wednesday). Although the data are in different
resolutions, we can recognize some trends that are marked by the arrows. We note that a
longer downward trend includes shorter upward and downward trends in (a) and (b).
the short-term variabilities has already been indicated by Takayasu et al. [4].
Despite of numerous works after the work, curious to say, discussions on the
origins of trends does not seem to be lively, although market participants are
used to pay more attention to the trend rather than the details of the short-
term variabilities to gain information of the overall movement of markets.
One of the major underlying reasons seems to be that the existence of the
trends is taken to be granted as those driven by some external factors, such
as economical fundamentals (for example, the gross domestic product (GDP)
varying according to policy interest rate, remarks by senior administration
officials or central bankers, and so on) and technical analyses of economists.
On the other hand, it is well known that the trends can also be observed
without any remarkable news about important economic index changes to
be released. Hence, it brings up a following simple question on the origin
of trends: if it were not for these external factors, do trends completely
disappear? We focus our attention mainly on this point.
The key idea for the present work is the following. Generally speak-
ing, to understand a certain phenomenon we need the information about its
structure, mechanism, situation, condition and so on. However, it is usually
impossible to obtain the entire information. Although this fact seems to be
trivial, we will show that trends can emerge indeed only from this simple and
trivial basis. The conclusion indicates that there is no clear time scale for di-
viding the price change clearly into short-term variabilities and trends. Both
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of them spontaneously emerge at the same time. In this regard, a trend is not
a dynamical movement generated by some external driving force but is an
accumulation of microscopic price updates of individual dealers due to flimsy
expectations. In this paper, we show two results obtained by our investiga-
tion based on this idea. First, we show that a trend of monotonic increase
or decrease can be generated within the framework of the simplest dealer
model with no external driving force only by including the effect of dealers’
minuscule price updates for the next deal trying to follow an expected forth-
coming direction of the price change. Next, we show that non-monotonic
trends spontaneously emerge when dealers cannot obtain accurate informa-
tion about the number of dealers participating in the next deal. This result
implies that trends are spontaneously generated even if the influence of fun-
damentals and technical analyses on financial markets is very weak or even
absent and suggests a possible unknown mechanism for generation of trends.
It should be mentioned here that, although we understand that it is im-
portant to reproduce basic empirical characteristics of real data, we do not
aspire for the reproduction in this paper. We simply focus on possible origins
of trends.2
This paper is organized as follows. We start from an existing deterministic
dealer model with threshold elements and add some essential modifications
to the original dealer model based on the key idea of dealers’ incomplete
information acquisition of the next deal. In Section 2, we briefly review the
original dealer model and its basic behaviours. In Section 3 we extend the
original dealer model to include microscopic and distinctive price updates of
individual dealers and show that trends are generated only by this extension
without introducing any external driving force term. Section 4 is for the
discussions and summary.
2 By the progress of computer technology we can obtain high frequency financial data
with high resolution time called tick data. The term “tick” refers to a minute change in
the price from deal to deal and a set of tick data represents the minimum movement of
price change produced by financial instruments. Various analyses have been done using
the tick data. However, we note that all deals are not precisely recorded in a set of tick
data. Tick data we usually obtain are measured at certain time intervals. There are not
many discussions about discrepancy of statistical nature between intermittent data and
data with all deals. In this paper, we are not going deep into the analysis of real data.
5
2. Current technologies: deterministic threshold dealer model
To generate trends and find possible (or unknown) origins of trends, we
use a previously proposed deterministic dealer model with threshold ele-
ments. As the original model is proposed in 1992 by Takayasu et al. [4], we
refer to the model as the “dealer model 92.” Since the dealer model 92 is
deterministic including no probabilistic factor, we expect that we are able to
have a better sense of the behaviours generated by the model. As the model
treats price change of all deals, the price data generated by the model should
be compared to tick data. For simplicity the deals in the model are assumed
to be concerning to only one brand3 in one market. Also, we assume that all
dealers participate deals with the same rule.
After the dealer model 92 was proposed, some modifications have been
made [5, 10, 11]. However, we consider that the modifications are artificial,
since all deals are done by only two dealers, that is, one buyer and one
seller. In the actual deals there are usually more than one sellers, which we
consider is one of the vital aspects of deals. As the dealer model 92 treats
such a situation, we adopt the dealer model 92.4
In this section we briefly review the dealer model 92 and clarify the mech-
anism of the price change.
2.1. Dealer model 92
Deals, composed of consecutive selling and buying, form a typical dis-
continuous and irreversible process. A deal is done, if a buying condition
and a selling condition meet, while it is undone, if not. This is the origin of
the discontinuity. The buyer and the seller of the last deal would never deal
again under the identical condition at least for a while. This is the origin of
the irreversibility. The dealer model 92 is introduced to reflect these aspects
3 The precise meaning of “brand” is an individual financial commodity.
4The dealer model 92 was modified by Sato and Takayasu in 1998 [5]. We refer to the
modified model as the dealer model 98. The dealer model 98 has the opposite assumption
to the dealer model 92. The dealer model 98 assumes that all dealers have a small amount
of properties and basically change their attitudes (that is, a buyer becomes a seller and
a seller becomes a buyer in the next deal) when the deals are done. Unlike the dealer
model 92, the dealer model 98 is tractable and can generate irregular fluctuations over
long periods like Fig. 1. This seems to be one of the supposed reasons that the subsequent
market price analyses are developed based on the dealer model 98 [10, 11].
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of dealing and we here begin by following the basic settings of the original
model [4].
The market is composed of N dealers. Let the i-th dealer’s buying price
and selling price be Bi and Si, respectively.
5 The selling price Si is larger
than the buying price Bi, and the difference Li = Si −Bi is always positive.
For simplicity we use a constant value L for all Li [4].
6 This simplification
gives L = Si − Bi for all i. A deal is done between pairs of i and j when
Bi ≥ Sj. In this model, a deal among all dealers is done when the following
condition is satisfied:
max{Bi} −min{Bi} ≥ L, (1)
where max{Bi} and min{Bi} indicate the maximum and minimum values.7
In the dealer model 92 there is one buyer and one or more than one sellers.
The buyer i is the dealer who gives the highest buying price Bi and can buy
at the price Bi from other dealers j who satisfy the following selling condition
max{Bi} − {Bj} ≥ L.
The price P (t) of the deal is therefore defined by the max{Bi}. If Eq. (1)




max{Bi} (when a deal is done),
P (t− 1) (when a deal is not done). (2)
When a deal is done, there are one buyer, sellers who could make the
deal, and the remainders who could not participate in the deal. However,
the remainder do not look wistfully and enviously at the deal with doing
nothing. As all dealers are potentially willing to participate in the deals,
they re-establish their prices for the next deal. Obviously, dealers who want
to buy need to offer higher price and dealers who want to sell need to offer
5Buying price Bi and selling price Si are called Ask and Bid in financial markets,
respectively.
6 We use a constant value for all Li. Although one might think that it is too simple to
be realistic, one of the purposes of this paper is to show that trends appear indeed even
under this simplest setting.
7Equation (1) has the same meaning of max{Bi} −min{Si} ≥ 0 because Si = Bi + L.
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cheaper price. To reflect the eagerness to participate in the next deal, the
i-th dealer’s expectation ai is introduced. The term represent a character of
the i-th dealer. If ai > 0, the dealer raises the price setting, and if ai < 0,
the dealer lowers the price setting. That is, dealers with ai > 0 and ai < 0
take the actions as buyers and sellers, respectively.
In this model each dealer is assumed to have his/her own expectation.
Hence, the values of ai are chosen from uniform random numbers in a range
and the mean of {ai} is set to be zero, which keeps the overall expectations
of dealers for buying and selling in equilibrium.8 As dealers becomes buyers
and sellers depending on their conditions and circumstances in the actual
financial markets, the details inside of the deals are very complicated. To
simplify the situation, however, as the model assumes that all dealers have
infinitely large amount of property, the dealers do not change their attitudes
even if a deal is done (that is, the sign of ai does not change) [4, 5]. Also,
this model is assumed to be in an invariant state (steady state). Hence, the
values of ai do not change once assigned [4].
An unique aspect of this model is that it takes into account an acquisitive
nature of the buyer and sellers for the next deal. It is assumed that the buyer
and sellers who could participate a deal expect that they can participate again
in the next deal with a cheaper price for the buyer and a higher price for
the sellers. The other dealers who could not participate in the previous deal
do not have such a psychological tendency. To reflect such a tendency, the
term ∆i is introduced:
∆i =

−δ (for the buyer),
δ/n (for the sellers),
0 (for the nonparticipants of the deal),
(3)
where 0 < δ < L and n is the number of the sellers of the deal. That is,
the next buying price of the buyer falls by the amount of δ from the current
buying price and the next selling prices of the sellers rises by the amount
of δ/n from the current selling prices. The buyer and sellers who could not
participate in the next deal have no anticipation. Also, when Eq. (1) is
8Broadly speaking, there are three economic expectations: (i) myopic expectation,
(ii) adaptive expectation and (iii) rational expectation. In the actual financial markets
a dealer’s expectation ai should be given based on some reasons. However, we do not
overinterpret it in this paper.
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Figure 3: (Colour online) Schematic diagram of ∆ from time t to t + 1 when Eq. (1) is
satisfied. The length of each vertical bar is the constant L. The top and bottom of each
bar correspond to the upper and lower threshold price of each dealer, respectively. The ∆
of the buyer is −δ and that of the sellers is δ/n, where 0 < δ < L and n is the number of
the sellers. The value of δ is constant defined by Eq. (3). In this figure the buyer is i = 2,
the sellers are i = 1 and 3 (n = 2), and the dealer i = 4 does not participate in the deal.
not satisfied (that is, a deal is not done), ∆i = 0 for all i. Note that the
summation of all ∆i is zero.
Based on these ideas, the price update for the i-th dealer in the dealer
model 92 is given by
Bi(t+ 1) = Bi(t) + ∆i(t) + ai + ci{P (t)− P (tprev)}, (4)
where the term ci characterizes the i-th dealer’s response to the change of
market price and tprev indicates the time when the last deal is done [4]. The
behaviour of Eq. (4) has already been scrutinized for various values of ci,
ai and the number of dealers, n and it is commonly known that Eq. (4) is
extremely unstable and uncontrollable when ci 6= 0 [4, 12]. For details
see [12]. Hence, we use Eq. (4) with ci = 0 as the dealer model 92 for the
starting point of our work, which becomes
Bi(t+ 1) = Bi(t) + ∆i(t) + ai. (5)
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(a) (b)
Figure 4: Typical behaviours of simulated price data P (t) of the dealer model 92, Eq. (5),
with Eq. (3), where (b) is an enlargement of (a), and both of black circle mark and line
are used to show details of price changes in (b). For the model N = 100, L = 1, α = 0.01
and δ = 0.4 are used. The value of ai and the initial condition of Bi(t) are taken from
uniform random numbers in the ranges (−α, α) and (−L,L), respectively.
2.2. Typical behaviours of the dealer model 92
We show typical behaviours generated by the dealer model 92 with Eq. (3)
for ∆i. To generate the data we take the number of dealers N = 100 and
δ = 0.4. The initial value of Bi(t) is taken from uniform random numbers
in the range (−L,L) with L = 1. The values of ai in Eq. (5) are taken from
uniform random numbers in the range (−α, α) with α = 0.01. As mentioned
above, to equalize dealers’ eagerness for buying and selling, the mean of {ai}
in Eq. (5) is set to be zero.9
Figure 4 shows the typical behaviours of price data P (t), where we use
the price data only when the deal is done. In Fig. 4(a), it is shown that the
behaviours are stable over long periods and P (t) fluctuates around the mean
value showing short-term variabilities but does not have trends. Figure 4(b)
shows that the price P (t) does not change drastically but slightly over time.
2.3. Some observations and possible reasons for lacking of trends
The zero value of the mean of the dealer’s expectation {ai} means that
the overall summation of the dealer’s expectation is zero. We note that this
9This setting for the mean of {ai} is not mentioned in [4] and is mentioned very casually
in [12]. However, we note that the setting is crucial. Without this setting, the data
generated by the dealer model 92 with Eq. (3) only show monotonic increase or decrease
in almost all cases, even if we use Eq. (5) (that is, Eq. (4) with ci = 0).
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does not necessarily mean that the number of dealers with ai > 0 should
be the same as that of dealers with ai < 0. The number of the dealers
with ai > 0 for Fig. 4 is 38 where the number of the total dealers is 100.
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From the observations, trends do not appear when dealers’ expectations for
buying and selling equal out. In other words, breaking the balance of dealers’
expectation of buying and selling could be vital for generating trends. Based
on this idea, we make attempts to generate trends under some well-defined
situations in the next section.
3. Exploration of origins for trends
In this section we make attempts to generate trends by extending the
dealer model 92 to the directions suitable to two realistic situations. The
one is the trend with supposition. We show that a trend emerges from the
intention of individual dealers following to the expected direction of forth-
coming price change. The other is the trend with no supposition. We show
that a trend emerges almost spontaneously only from incomplete information
of the dealers even if they do not have any intention for the deals. After con-
sidering these two trends separately, we combine both ideas into one model
and generate data using it.
3.1. Trends with supposition: premeditated trends
We show here that we are able to generate monotonic increase or decrease
trends at our disposal only by introducing the effect of intentions of individual
dealers following to the expected direction of forthcoming price change. It is
widely believed that continuous trends in relatively long-terms are generated
by fundamentals. It is considered that fundamentals influence dealers’ longer-
term intention and the major trends in the relative long term are believed
to be generated by the dealers’ supposition. We consider that the effect of
fundamentals comes into the dealer model through the supposition of dealers
for the direction of the price change in a relatively long term due to the
changes in fundamentals.11
10This number of the buyers is slightly extreme examples. As {ai} is uniformly dis-
tributed between −α and α with α > 0, the number with ai > 0 is usually around half of
the total.
11 We note that the correspondence between the types of fundamentals and the types
of trends is basically unknown. Hence, we therefore avoid the overinterpretation of this
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As Eqs. (3) and (5) show, when a deal is done, the buyer brings down the
asking price for the next deal,12 expecting that it might be possible to buy
at a cheaper price. Similarly, when a deal is done, the sellers bring up their
selling prices for the next deal, expecting that it might be possible to sell at
a higher price.
How does the acquisitiveness change in the existence of an expected direc-
tion of price change in a market? When an increase (or decrease) direction of
price change is expected in a market, it seems to be plausible that a dealer,
whether the dealer is either a buyer or a seller, considers that other dealers
are also not likely to take the same attitude in the next deal if the dealer of-
fers a higher (or cheaper) price. To incorporate this idea, we redefine Eq. (3)
with the small values εb and εs as follows:
∆i =

−δ × (1.0 + εb) (for the buyer),
(δ × εs)/n (for the sellers),
0 (for the nonparticipants of the deal),
(6)
where 0 < δ < L and n is the number of the sellers of the deal as taken in
Eq. (3). For newly introduced parameters, εb and εs, −1 ≤ εb ≤ 0 and εs ≥ 0
when a monotonic increase of price change is expected, and 0 ≤ εb ≤ 1 and
εs ≤ 0 when a monotonic decrease of price change is expected.
Figure 5 is the data generated by the dealer model 92 with Eq. (6) instead
of Eq. (3) where εb = ±0.002 and εs = 0. We find a monotonically increasing
trend for εb = −0.002 and a monotonically decreasing trend for εb = 0.002
on Fig. 5(a). It should be noted that, as these monotonically increasing and
decreasing trends are very slow, we cannot recognize the trends clearly if we
take shorter period of time for observation, as is shown in Fig. 5(b). We
have also confirmed that the dealer model 92 with (εb, εs) = (0, 0.002) show
similar behaviours. Although the values of the parameters are small, this
tiny little ulterior motive generates major trends. The results indicate that
the trends are built on a delicate balance of acquisitive natures between the
buyers and sellers. The results also indicate that, even if the amount of a
change in the psychological tendency of a dealer is very small, it can bring a
relationship and do not touch on the problem. We simply focus on the problem of how we
can generate monotonic increase and decrease trends by dealers’ supposition.
12Although the price brought by ai goes up and that by δ goes down, the total asking
price falls as a result, as δ is larger than ai.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5: (Colour online) Monotonic increase and decrease trends generated by dealer
model 92 with Eq. (6), where (b) is an enlargement of (a). εb = −0.002 for a monotonic
increase trend, εb = 0.002 for a monotonic decrease trend, and εs = 0 for both the cases.
The data with no trend is the same as that shown in Fig. 4(a). We show it for the for
comparison. All other conditions are the same in Fig. 4.
major influence on the market prices.
When we use larger values of εb or εs or when we use the pair of εb and
εs together, we have confirmed to obtain steeper trends.
3.2. Trends with no supposition: unpremeditated trends
In the previous section we have confirmed that monotonic trends emerge
by dealers’ expectation of the forthcoming price change, even if it is minus-
cule. In this case we can guess or estimate the underlying expectation of
individual dealers based on their behaviours. In numerical calculations, we
can obtain complete information about all deals. It should be emphasized,
however, that it is almost impossible to acquire complete information in ac-
tual deals. In this section, we focus on the case in which only incomplete
information on the deals is available and the influence of fundamentals and
technical analyses on financial markets are almost absent.
Let us carefully examine an important feature of the dealer model 92.
Generally speaking, it is impossible that all dealers in actual financial markets
exactly know the number of sellers in every deal in advance. However, the
number of sellers n is included in Eq. (3) to reflect the acquisitive nature
of the dealers. That is, the dealer model 92 contains a parameter which is
impossible to know in advance in actual deals, though this parameter n plays
a crucial role in the model. As Eq. (3) shows, the buyer’s price falls δ and
each of n sellers’ prices rises δ/n when a deal is done. In other words, the
13
total amount of the rises of the sellers’ prices n × δ/n exactly compensates
for the decline of the buyer’s price δ. Because of this exact compensation
effect, the price data generated by the dealer model 92 with Eq. (3) have
only short-term variabilities and do not have trends.
It is unlikely and unnatural for sellers to know the precise number of
sellers in any deal in advance (no dealer actually knows it). However, it is
possible to know the number of sellers in the past deals. Let us examine the
behaviours of the number of sellers of the data shown in Fig. 4. Figure 6 shows
that the number of sellers varies wildly at each deal, where the minimum is
1 and the maximum is 14. It does not seem to be easy to predict the next
number of sellers using the past data.13 In such cases each seller would have
no other choice than to obey his/her own guess for the next price change. As
a result, the expectation for buying and selling would not always cancel out.
To formulate this situation simply, we use the average seller number µn(t)
instead of the precise seller number n in Eq. (3), where µn(t) is calculated
using all of the seller number prior to time t (that is, from 1 to t − 1). We
note that this idea is not so irrelevant. When the prediction of the future
value does not seem to be easy, one of the common approaches is to use the
mean of the past values: the average number of sellers who participated deals
in the past. Based on these considerations,14 Eq. (3) is modified as follows:
∆i =

−δ (for the buyer),
δ/µn(t) (for the sellers),
0 (for the nonparticipants of the deal),
(7)
where 0 < δ < L.
Figure 7 shows the behaviours of the dealer models 92 with the modifi-
cation by Eq. (7), where the average sellers number is used instead of the
precise sellers number. Figure 7(a) shows that the simulated price data P (t)
13We apply the small-shuffle surrogate (SSS) method to the data [13]. The result indi-
cates that the data are independently distributed random variables or time-varying random
variables. Hence, we conclude that we cannot predict the number of sellers using the past
data.
14The essence of this modification is to make an imbalance between the sellers’ price
rises and the buyer’s price decline. Although the buyer’s price decline −δ is a constant
value in Eq. (7), the buyer could change the value depending on situations and it is indeed





Figure 6: The number of sellers of Fig. 4. The data is generated by dealer model 92 of of
Eq. (5). Plot (b) is an enlargement of (a). All other conditions are the same in Fig. 4.
have short-term variabilities and exhibit the appearance of long-term ris-
ing and falling behaviours of trends. The difference in the behaviour from
the one for the original dealer model 92 shown in Fig. 4 due to the simple
modification from n to µn(t) in the definition of ∆i is striking. The overall
behaviour seems to be similar to the real data shown in Fig. 1. The original
dealer model 92 with Eq. (3) generates only behaviours without trends [4], as
shown in Fig. 4. Although we do not input previously prepared trends and
add any driving force term to generate trends forcibly to the model, a variety
of trends emerge under the condition that complete information about deals
cannot be obtained in advance. This result implies that the dealer model 92
intrinsically contains the ability to behaviour trends without adding any ex-
ternal terms. Figure 7(b) shows that the average number of sellers converges
very quickly. In contrast, from Fig. 7(c) that shows the number of sellers at
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each deal,15 the number fluctuates wildly at each deal between 1 and 13. The
behaviour is similar to Fig. 6(a). We emphasize that the emergence of the
long-term monotonic increase and decrease of price change (that is, “trends”)
from the dealer model 92 is rarely reported. In Fig. 7 we calculate µn(t) us-
ing all of the seller number data prior to the deal at t, although taking the
average over all seller number is not essential. Averaging over the data in a
certain interval, that is to say, the last 100 seller number data from t− 1 to
t− 100, is equally permissible for generating trends.
As mentioned above, the dealer model 92 with the present modification,
Eq. (7), includes no driving force term to generate previously prepared trends.
This result suggests that trends are not generated dynamically by external
driving forces but emerge spontaneously from the aggregation of microscopic
expectations of individual dealers.
Figure 8 shows different behaviours from that shown in Fig. 7(a), where
different initial conditions of Bi and different values of ai are used. We find
that there are short-term variabilities and trends in Figs. 8(a) and (b). We
can also recognize a variety of movements such as upward, downward or
sideways in Figs. 8(a) and (b). A trend in a long-term includes finer trends
in shorter terms. For example, in Fig. 8(b) we recognize downward trends
around the ticks between 7000 and 8500 and between 9000 and 11000, and an
upward trend between 11000 and 12000. When we look at these price changes
in a longer time scale, we recognize a downward trend around between 7000
and 15000. The overall downward trend thus contains these three short-term
trends.
We also find another feature. One of the characteristic changes in the
market price evolution is its sharp or abrupt change [4]. We find it around
the ticks between 25500 and 26000 on Fig. 1(a) and between 24900 and 25500
on Fig. 1(b). We also find a similar sharp change on Fig. 8(b) between 13700
and 13800. It is remarkable that a little modification of the original dealer
model 92 by Eq. (7) can produce such a variety of price changes exhibiting
vital features seen in real financial markets.
15We apply the SSS method to the number of sellers (not average number) [13]. As it is
for the previous application of the SSS method to the average number, the result indicates






Figure 7: Typical behaviours of the dealer models 92 using the average number of sellers
in the past. (a) simulated price data P (t), (b) the average number of sellers, and (c) the
number of sellers at each deal. All other parameter settings are the same in Fig. 4.
3.3. Mingled trends with supposition and no supposition: premeditated trends
and unpremeditated trends
In Section 3.1, we discussed an idea to generate monotonic increase and
decrease trends. In Section 3.2, we discussed the emergence of trends due
to the imbalance between the momentum of buying and selling because of
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(a) (b)
Figure 8: Different behaviours from that shown in Fig. 7(a), where different initial condi-
tions of Bi and different values of ai are used. All other parameter settings are the same
in Fig. 7.
incomplete information about the next deal. Although we discussed these
two cases separately to make the arguments clear, they are strongly inter-
connected and mingled with each other in real financial markets. In this
Section, therefore, we treat these two cases on the same footing.
Incorporating both ideas described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we adopt the
following combined and improved modification for ∆i:
∆i =

−δ × (1.0 + εb) (for the buyer),
δ/µn(t) (for the sellers),
0 (for nonparticipants of the deal),
(8)
where the notations of δ and n are the same as described in Eq. (3) and the
notations of εb and µn(t) as the same as described in Eqs. (6) and (7).
We generate price changes using the dealer model 92 with the modifi-
cation Eq. (8) for different values of εb. The results show complicated and
a wide variety of behaviours. Figure 9 shows one of the explicit results.16
We also show the plots for the data corresponding to unpremeditated trends
defined by εb = 0 for comparison. By replacing the number of sellers n with
the average value µn(t), the profiles of the trends becomes significantly sus-
16We examined the behaviours using different values of initial conditions of Bi, that of ai
and that of εb. We found that remarkable different behaviours were found at |εb| = 0.015.
When |εb| >= 0.015 we found that monotonic increase or decrease trends tend to appear.
When |εb| < 0.015 we found complicated behaviours like Figs. 9(b) and (c).
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ceptible to the actual values of εb. Without the replacement of n with µn(t),
a negative εb generates a monotonically increasing trend, and a positive εb
generates a monotonically decreasing trend as shown in Fig. 5. Figure 9(a)
shows similar results for εb = ±0.031. However, the sign of εb does not have
a simple relationship with increasing or decreasing nature of trends in this
case. For Fig. 9(b), we use a much smaller absolute value for |εb| = 0.0021
than that used in Fig. 9(a), |εb| = 0.031. In this plot, a trend produced
by the positive value, εb = 0.0021, shows much more prominent increase
than that produced by the negative value, εb = −0.0021. Only by taking
a slightly smaller absolute value, |εb| = 0.002, we see that a negative value,
εb = −0.002, generates a decreasing trend and a positive value, εb = 0.002,
generates an increasing trend as shown in Fig. 9(c). Note that these values,
|εb| = 0.002, are the same as those used in Fig. 5.
4. Discussions and Summary
When we use both ideas to generate trends with supposition and no sup-
position at the same time in Section 3.3, we observed two distinctive aspects.
One is that dealers’ minuscule tendencies in next price setting can make a
large difference in the overall behaviours of price change. The other is that
there are cases where the behaviours of price change are different from, even
opposite to, individual dealers’ expectations. Both of the aspects indicate
that the direction of trends cannot tell us the underlying expectations of
the dealers. In other words, the behaviours of the trend do not always ac-
cord with dealers’ long-term expectations. This leads to a very intriguing
conclusion. From the behaviours or movements of price change, each dealer
infers his/her specious justification of the cause of the change and offer future
prospects to others in the next deal. Once the price in a market moves against
their expectations, however, dealers doubt their justifications and may take
a counter reaction to their original expectation. Such counter reactions of
the dealers may cause excess volatility.
We understand that there might be other origins to generate trends than
the ones described in this paper. The reason we believe that the origins
discussed in the present paper are essential is their universality. As no dealer
has access to complete information about the next deal in actual financial
markets, dealers have no choice other than to have their own expectations. As
these expectations are brought by incomplete information, the expectations





Figure 9: (Colour online) Mingled trends generated by the improved dealer model 92
defined by Eq. (8): (a) εb = −0.031 for plot ω and εb = 0.031 for plot λ, (b) εb = −0.0021
for plot ω and εb = 0.0021 for plot λ, (c) εb = −0.002 for plot ω and εb = 0.002 for plot λ.
All plots labelled by γ in (a), (b), and (c) are the data generated by εb = 0. Note that
plot of ω originally corresponds to a monotonic increase trend, that of λ to a monotonic
decrease trend, and that of γ to unpremeditated trends. All other conditions are the same
in Fig. 4.
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break a subtle balance of acquisitive natures between buyers and sellers and
generate macroscopic trends, even if there are no external driving factors.
Since the situations in which we cannot obtain complete information about
the next status are very common, we believe that the knowledge gained from
the ideas pursued in this paper contains an essential ingredient and can be
applicable to many other situations For example, we often find the price
changes in actual markets that exhibit very similar behaviours, although the
brands are different, such as Australian Dollar/USD exchange rate and New
Zealand Dollar/USD exchange rate.
Our results indicate that some trends might be unpremeditated. Al-
though the trends emerge spontaneously, why their behaviours are so simi-
lar? What kind of interactions are there between the brands? Those will be
very interesting future questions.
Summary of the results is the following. In this paper, we have inves-
tigated possible origins of trends in financial market price changes using a
deterministic threshold model called the dealer model 92. We consider fi-
nancial markets as a game field of commercial activity composed of human
choices and their interactions. First, we have observed that monotonically
increasing and decreasing trends can be generated by dealers’ minuscule ten-
dencies for price setting according to the expected forthcoming price changes.
Next, we have observed that irregular fluctuations with short-term variabili-
ties and trends emerge spontaneously under the assumption that we cannot
obtain complete information about the next deal in advance. In both cases,
trends are generated without introducing any external driving forces to the
original dealer modes 92. Finally, we have confirmed that the numerical
data for price change generated by the dealer model 92 incorporating both of
these two cases contains several vital features observed in real financial mar-
kets. These results indicates that emergence of trends might be inevitable in
any realistic situations, even if the influence on fundamentals and technical
analyses in financial markets is almost absent.
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